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Abstract. Recent studies have used regression decomposition to analyze recent data and 
found that over seventy percent of the black-white wealth differences remained unexplained 
(See, e.g., Gittleman & Wolff 2000; Altonji, Doraszelski & Segal 2000; and Blau & 
Graham 1990). Their results are limited to the variation in modern data. This study 
contributes improved methodology and historical empirical results to the literature on 
economic discrimination. In this paper, (i) presents structural regression decompositions, 
which are modifications to methods developed by Becker (1957) and Oaxaca (1973); (ii) 
presents a basic empirical test when analyzing structural regression decompositions; (iii) 
reports the estimated sources of black-white differences in wealth directly before and after 
emancipation; (iv) links these findings to recent studies. Empirical estimates confirm that 
the size and persistence of modern black-white wealth differences have historical roots. (v) 
presents decision-making considerations of “individuals” in an economy with grouped 
individuals, owners of firms, and social planner(s), conditional on wealth constraints with 
applied social economic considerations.  
Keywords. Theory of economic discrimination, Structural regression decomposition, 
Wealth inequality. 
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1. Introduction: Case one: Agent-specific constraints 
MAX{xnij ≥ 0}  U = γUПSP=1USP θ(SP)  
 
subject to  XijSP ≤ EijSP   
 
Let:  USP= γU(SP)Пj=1(Пi=1uij(SP)θij(SP))   
 
such that U   = γ*ПSP=1[Пj=1(Пi=1uij(SP)θ*)]  
  
where  γ* = γU ПSP=1 γU(SP) 
  
  θ* = θ ij(SP)θ(SP)  
 
Further, let: uijSP = γuijSPПn=1(x(n)ij-sx(n)ijSP)α(n) 
 
such that U   = γ’ПSP=1[Пj=1(Пi=1(Пn=1(x(n)ij-sx(n)ijSP)α(n)’))]  
 
where  γ’ = γU [ПSP=1γU(SP) (Пj=1(Пi=1 γuijSP))] 
 
  α(n)’ = α(n)θ ij(SP)θ(SP)  
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Further, let: EijSP  = Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP + px(l)ex(l)ij + eijSP   for all n = 1,2,..,E  ≠  l 
 
Further, let: X ij = Σn=1 Px(n)jx(n)ij + px(l)jx(l)ij 
 
where  Px(n) j = px(n)(1+δxjg+ Σ q=1t’qx(n))  
 
  Px(E) = η(B) 
 
Therefore, the decision becomes: 
 
MAX{xnij ≥ 0}  U =γ’ПSP=1[Пj=1(Пi=1(Пn=1(xnij-sx(n)ijSP)α(n)’))]  
 
subject to  Σn=1 Px(n) j x(n)ij + px(l)jx(l)ij ≤ Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP + px(l)ex(l)ij + eijSP 
 
 
Further, let: Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP + Σv=1wvhvij = Wij 
 
where  wv = px(l) 
  
  hvij = ex(l)ij - x(l)ij 
 
2. Case two: One universal constraint 
 
MAX {xnij ≥ 0}  U = γUПSP=1USP θ(SP)  
 
Subject to  X ≤ ε   
 
Further, let: ε = Σ SP=1ESP + e 
  
  ESP = Σi=1Σ j=1EijSP + eSP 
 
  EijSP = E x(n)ijSP + Σi=1Σ j=1 px(l)ex(l)ij + eij   for all n = 1,2,..,E  ≠  l 
 
  E x(n)ijSP =Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP  
 
such that ε = Σi=1Σ j=1Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP + Σi=1Σ j=1 px(l)ex(l)ij + e*  
 
where  e* = e + Σ SP=1eSP + Σi=1Σ j=1eij 
 
Further, let: X = Σi=1Σj=1 Σn=1Px(n)jx(n)ij + Σi=1 Σj=1px(l)jx(l)ij 
 
where  Px(n) j = px(n)(1+δxjg+ Σ q=1t’qx(n))  
 
  Px(E) = η(B) 
 
Therefore, the decision becomes: 
 
MAX{xnij ≥ 0}  U =γ’ПSP=1[Пj=1(Пi=1(Пn=1(xnij-sx(n)ijSP)α(n)’))]  
 
subject to  Σi=1Σj=1 Σn=1Px(n)jx(n)ij+Σi=1 Σj=1px(l)jx(l)ij≤Σi=1Σ j=1Σn=1px(n)ex(n)ijSP+Σi=1Σ j=1 
px(l)ex(l)ij+e* 
 
Let:  Σi=1Σ j=1Σn=1 px(n)ex(n)ijSP + Σv=1Σi=1 Σj=1wvhvij =  Σi=1Σ j=1Wij 
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where  wv = px(l) 
  
  hvij = ex(l)ij - x(l)ij 
 
3. A model of wealth 
 
Let:  Wij = (1-g-Σ q=1tqI)Iij + Aij + (1-g)(Σ q=1Sqij + Cij) - Gij 
 
  Iij  = Σv=1 w’v h’ vij  
 
  w’v = wv - δw(v)jg- Σ q=1t’q 
 
  h’ vij = h vij - δh(v)jg 
 
  Aij =  [ A0ij(1-g-Σ q=1tqA(0)) + Σ a=1N(1,a)ij(Ri,Mi)(1-g-Σ q=1tqN(1,a))  
 
   + Σm=1γπ(m)ij πZ(m)ij(1-g) ] (1+ γρij ρ)(1-Σ q=1tqρ)  
 
           + Σ b=1N(2,b)ij(Ri,Mi)(1-g- Σ q=1tqN(2,b)) - Gρij - δAjg(ρ,A0ij) 
 
  A0ij =A0ij(xn0,γW(0)ijFW0F(I0(w0,h0,S0),A0(A(-1),N0(R0,M0),γ0 π(m)π0Zm),t0q,δ0g,γ0ρ),R,M) 
  
  πZ(m)ij = (PZ(m)jZmij + Σq=1SqZ(m)ij – Σd=1PZ(m,d)jXZ(m,d)ij) (1 - Σ q=1tq π(m)) 
 
  PZ(m) j = pZ(m)(1 - δZ(m)jg + Σ q=1t’qZ(m)) 
 
  Zmij = γZmijПd=1XZ(m,d)ij β(d) 
 
  PZ(m,d) j = pZ(m,d)(1 - δZ(m,d)jg - Σ q=1t’qZ(m)) 
 
  XZ(m,d)ij = xZ(m,d)ij - δZ(m,d)jg  
 
where 
S is subsidies,  
g is the tithe,  
G is offerings,  
q is governments,  
C is social capital, i.e. food and medications from societal organizations, 
ρ is the rate of return, 
γ is the knowledge on scaling the rate of return, i.e. the 1996-97 INVESCO case 
study, 
d is inputs, 
N1 is appreciative, 
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